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Materialist and Causal Bridges Over the Explanatory Gap 
Celine Geday 
 
 Introduction: The Explanatory Gap 
 The explanatory gap about the subjective nature of conscious 
experience is the gap in explanation between conscious experience, 
and available scientific explanations of conscious experience. The 
explanatory gap is, as Joseph Levine states, the problem that 
physicalism (or the physical sciences) has in describing mental terms 
and experiences.7 Thomas Nagel also describes the explanatory gap 
problem as the problem of explaining the subjective in objective 
terms. He states that the subjective viewpoint of the individual is 
inherently at odds with an objective, or physical explanation.8 
Describing someone’s experience of the redness of red, for example, 
by describing the neural mechanisms that fire when he or she sees red 
might seem to leave out the phenomenal aspect of experience in 
explanation. This is an example of what might be thought of as a gap 
in explanation between what the physical sciences say about mental 
properties, and what introspection reveals about mental properties. 
Describing mental events as identical with brain events is normally 
called materialism, which stands in opposition to a dualist, or  
non-reductivist treatment of the psychological nature of 
mental phenomena. 
                                                 
7 Joseph Levine, “On Leaving Out What It’s Like,” in The Nature of 
Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, ed. Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, Güven 
Güzeldere. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), 547-548, 550. 
8 Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 83 
(1974): 442-443, 448. 
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 I offer here some arguments to motivate the materialist side of 
the explanatory gap problem. The argument that I believe provides the 
greatest impetus for a materialist understanding of mental events is 
that of the causal closure of the physical world. I present this 
argument through the lens of Jaegwon Kim’s work. The causal 
closure of the physical world can be thought of as the completeness of 
physical theories, with no epiphenomenal residue supervening on, or 
existing over-and-above physical properties. Epiphenomenal 
properties are those that have no causal effect on the world; they are 
causally inert. Because they are causally inert, it remains difficult to 
see how they can be explained by physically-explainable phenomena, 
being nonphysical themselves. The causal closure of the physical 
world, I suggest, is best illuminated with respect to the problem of the 
gaps in explanations of consciousness through the work of Jaegwon 
Kim. This kind of argument is also known in metaphysics as the 
"Eleatic Principle" originating from Graham Oddie's work, which in 
part, refers to Plato’s Eleatic Stranger in the Sophist. I argue that 
theories of qualitative properties must cohere with the causal closure 
of the physical world, and so must meet a causal closure condition. I 
use the term qualitative properties to refer to the properties of mental 
states that can then refer to the character of sensations, which is taken 
from Austen Clark.9 Qualitative properties, for Clark, are properties 
of sensation that enable the phenomenal appearances of things.10 On 
Clark’s model, sensations enable phenomenal experience, so this term 
                                                 
9 Austen Clark, A Theory of Sentience, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 8, 
http://selfpace.uconn.edu/paper/ClarkAusSentient.pdf. 
10 Ibid., 6. 
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will be consistent with a materialist description of  
subjective experience.  
 I then offer what I take to be the best materialist account 
available that is likely to be compatible with a causal closure 
condition. This account is Austen Clark’s feature-placing hypothesis. 
Although this account is compatible with Kim’s causal closure, it 
does complicate Kim's secondary conclusion from an argument for 
causal closure, which is that qualia should be defined functionally, by 
the roles that they perform. Feature-placing is at odds with 
functionalism because feature-placing defines qualitative properties 
relationally, without any direct reference to distal, causal stimuli. Kim 
puts forward functionalism as a way of individuating different qualia 
uniquely, however Clark’s features themselves are not defined by 
their causal role, but relationally. In this way, features and organisms’ 
abilities to locate them involve no direct reference to distal properties.  
Clark suggests that features are relational and not functionally 
definable by the distal properties that directly might cause them, and 
he bases this idea on two notions. The first is that there is wide 
variation across observers, such that reference to a single stimulus that 
causes sensation of orange does not account for differences in 
observers.11 The second is that there remain problems of individuating 
qualitative properties, in reference to stimuli, uniquely for a 
functionalist account.12 The idea that one observer might see the color 
green for what another person sees as red illustrates the problem, and 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 12. 
12 Austen Clark, “Sensing, Objects, and Awareness: Reply to Commentators,” 
Philosophical Psychology 17 (2010): 577. 
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this is known as the problem of inverted qualia. Clark argues hence, 
that what makes qualitative properties unique cannot be defined by 
stimuli,13 but rather by picking out the locations of qualitative 
properties in space-time.  
 Despite Clark’s account being at odds with functionalism, the 
feature-placing hypothesis provides a viable demonstration of the 
individuation of qualitative properties in another way, which is that of 
positing the spatial discrimination capacities of organisms, and these 
capacities are enabled by neural functions. He demonstrates that we 
have spatial discrimination capacities to pick out the locations of 
features. Spatial discrimination capacities are enabled by cortical 
maps in the brain, whose information, when bound together by the 
subject, allows for the individuation of unique qualia, and allows for 
the relational content of qualitative properties themselves to refer to 
their locations in space around a perceiver.  
Clark also suggests that on the feature-placing hypothesis, sentience is 
a primitive stage of perception, within a hierarchy of preattentive 
processes leading up to the conscious awareness of an organism. 
Clark holds that we have both spatial discrimination capacities, and 
capacities to discriminate qualitative properties, or the features of 
sensation. These capacities used together serve to individuate the 
content of qualia uniquely.  
 Clark’s account remains compatible with causal closure 
because feature-placing individuates qualia uniquely through the 
spatial discrimination capacities that organisms possess, and those 
                                                 
13 Clark, A Theory of Sentience, 12. 
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capacities are neural functions. This aspect of Clark’s hypothesis is 
compatible with the idea that mental properties do not supervene on 
physical properties, but rather, are physical processes. This is how 
Clark’s account remains compatible with a causal closure condition, 
in that the spatial discrimination capacities of perceivers reduce to 
properties of brain mechanisms, such as neural feature maps. Feature 
maps are cortical maps that guide behavior.[14][15] Clark’s feature-
placing hypothesis also remains compatible with causal closure 
because it is preattentive- that is, it is an account of early perceptual 
processes and thus sensory content on this account, is nonconceptual. 
I offer that both Kim's and Clark’s accounts support physical 
explanations of qualia and motivate the materialist side of the 
explanatory gap. 
 In conclusion, I offer that Clark’s account of spatial 
discrimination and relational qualia is compatible with the causal 
closure of the physical world because the processes of feature-placing 
are reducible to neural states. I present Kim’s causal closure argument 
because I believe it is the strongest motivation for physical 
explanations of mental content. I argue that explaining qualitative 
properties relationally, and explaining their individuation through 
spatial discrimination is the best way to approach the problem of 
solving the explanatory gap in that it provides a potential bridge from 
consciousness to physical theories that is compatible with naturalism.  
 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 45. 
15 Austen Clark, “How Do Feature Maps Represent?” Early Content Conference 
(2006): http://selfpace.uconn.edu/paper/ClarkAusUmEarly.html 
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 Jaegwon Kim and Mental Causation 
 Jaegwon Kim in his book Physicalism, or Something Near 
Enough proposes that mental causation cannot occur unless the 
mental is physically reducible.16 Kim offers that the only way to 
reduce aspects of consciousness, like sensation to physical states is by 
functionally explaining the processes that constitute an individual’s 
sensory experiences.17 A functional description of the mechanisms 
involved in sensation will iterate the jobs that those mechanisms have 
in the system of the organism. For example, on a sort of low-level or 
realizer functionalist position, a pain sensation can be described as 
being identical with C-fibers firing in in an organism’s nervous 
system. In this way, Kim takes an ontological naturalist standpoint in 
which there are no immaterial substances in the world like souls, or 
immaterial minds.[18][19]  This can also be thought of broadly as the 
notion that world is composed of physical parts, whatever those parts 
may be. 
 Theories of consciousness for Kim, and thus the causal status 
of the mental, need to be based on the causal closure of physical 
world.20 The causal closure of the physical world on Kim’s analysis 
states that “if a physical event at time t has a cause at t, then it has a 
                                                 
16 Jaegwon Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton & Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 159. 
17 Ibid., 172. 
18 Ibid., 71, 84. 
19 Jaegwon Kim, “From Naturalism to Physicalism: Supervenience Redux,” 
Proceeding and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 85 (2011): 
113. 
20 Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, 156. 
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physical cause at time t.”21  The consequence of Kim’s analysis of 
mental causation is that the subjective character of experience loses 
its causal effectiveness. Kim states that traditional emergentist, or 
supervenience theories (which are non-reductive physicalist theories 
about the mental) take the position that the mental is both irreducible 
to the physical, and has causal efficacy.22 Kim states that this form of 
mind-body supervenience is a way of saving agency and free will.23  
Emergentist and supervenience theories believe the mental to be 
irreducible to the physical because consciousness is said to have 
intrinsic and ineffable properties.24 However, Kim states that these 
theories face the problem of overdetermination.25 In this way, those 
theories are incompatible with causal closure. For example, consider 
the scenario in which there are two (supposedly) causal properties for 
one effect that is physical. If one of the causal properties is physical 
and the other is non-physical, in determining which of these caused 
the effect, the non-physical property is the property that is first to 
become epiphenomenal. This situation demonstrates the workings of 
causal overdetermination. If physicalism is taken seriously, then 
positing two causes, for one physical effect leaves one of them 
epiphenomenal. In the case of the mind-body problem, for Kim, 
physical processes would be biological processes, and their effects are 
observable behavior.26 Thus, Kim holds that the intrinsic nature of 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 15. 
22 Ibid., 19-20, 33-35. 
23 Ibid., 33-35, 152-153. 
24 Ibid., 165, 173. 
25 Ibid., 45. 
26 Ibid., 23, 167. 
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consciousness is not physically reducible, and therefore, has no causal 
effect on the physical world.  
 However, Kim states that conscious experience can be 
characterized functionally, given observable behaviors of conscious 
experience.27 Kim suggests that certain parts of the mental are 
reducible, such as intentionality, with intentionality referring to 
beliefs, desires, and perception.28 For Kim, if the intentional or 
cognitive aspects of the mental are functionally definable, there has to 
be mechanistic realizers of those functions, even if they are not all 
available in immediate scientific research.29 When Kim describes the 
functionalizability of intentionality, he outlines humans’ capacity for 
language and the behaviors resulting from communication as an 
example of the mechanisms by which belief, thought, and desire can 
be realized.30  
 Kim also suggests that sensory experience, or the qualitative 
character of experience, can be expressed functionally. He posits that 
this can occur by explaining the similarity and difference relations 
between sensory experiences among organisms.31 For example, he 
holds that a sensory experience of the sight of a yellow traffic light 
produces similar discriminable behavior among individuals using 
traffic lights in most cities and towns.32 For Kim, the discriminability 
of sensory experiences allows for detectable behavioral differences. 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 172-173. 
28 Ibid., 5, 165-166. 
29 Ibid., 164. 
30 Ibid., 166. 
31 Ibid., 172-174. 
32 Ibid., 172. 
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These behavioral differences, he offers, are what are 
functionalizable.33 This is what Kim calls “conditional 
reductionism.”34 Conditional reductionism means that qualitative 
properties are reducible to their functions, or to their causal roles, on 
the condition that the behavior caused by sensory experience is 
observable. This is to say that the mental realm is reducible, but 
intrinsic qualia, is not physically reducible. Kim calls this the mental 
residue that is left over after qualia are functionally explained.35 
Kim’s account addresses the problems of the non-reductivist 
motivations for the explanatory gap. While non-reductive intuitions 
coincide with conceptions of intentionality, like thoughts, desires, and 
beliefs as being introspectable, and providing individuals with a kind 
of agency, Kim demonstrates that the ineffable properties of 
subjective experience become epiphenomenal when faced with the 
task of explaining how they cause physical behavior. It is important to 
consider correlations with behavior and experience as explanatory of 
experience, I hold, because this is consistent with revising and 
figuring out more exact theoretical explanations of consciousness. 
Kim shows how the explanatory gap cannot be bridged by theories 
that use non-reductive, and thus epiphenomenal properties to do 
explanatory work. 
 However, materialist theories may not all coincide exactly 
with Kim’s causal closure requirements. For example, Clark’s 
account complicates Kim’s conclusion that qualia should be defined 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 172-173. 
34 Ibid., 161. 
35 Ibid., 170. 
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functionally, by the roles that they perform, which is a consequence of 
his an argument for causal closure. I argue that despite this 
complication, Clark’s feature-placing hypothesis is compatible with 
the kind of causal closure Kim sets out because on Clark’s account, 
qualitative properties remain reducible to physical properties, despite 
being relationally defined, and having no relationship to the distal 
stimuli that Kim suggests can constitute the discriminable similarity 
and differences of intentionality and qualia on a functionalist account. 
The physical properties that qualitative properties reduce to, on 
Clark’s account, are neural mechanisms such as feature maps and 
selective attention processes. Additionally, Clark’s feature-placing 
hypothesis offers another way of individuating qualia uniquely, which 
is that of the spatial representation of qualitative properties. In these 
ways, Clark’s feature-placing hypothesis can be seen as supporting a 
materialist explanation of qualitative properties, and suggests 
possibilities for bridging the explanatory gap. 
 
 Austen Clark’s Feature-Placing Hypothesis 
 In A Theory of Sentience, Austen Clark calls the mental 
representation of a sensory experience, feature-placing. Mental 
representation is the idea that when one has experiences, those 
experiences are about, or represent something. Feature-placing on 
Clark’s account explains qualitative properties relationally via mental 
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representation upon which subjects pick out place-times.36 Place-
times can be thought of as regions or locations in space-time.37  
 Picking out place-times is equivalent to having spatial 
discrimination abilities, or spatio-temporal-discrimination abilities. 
Sentient creatures possess these abilities, which act to indicate the 
locations of qualitative properties via the different sensory 
modalities.[38][39]  Clark offers that locations are picked out through a 
causal chain of information, where conditional probabilities between 
inputs and outputs determine the information channel.40 On one end 
of this causal chain might be feature maps, discussed more below, 
which are cortical regions where cells are activated, and these 
processes guide the behavior of the organism. 
 The feature-placing hypothesis defines the instances of 
sensations in a given sensory modality as related to one another, 
comparatively. Because the structure of qualitative properties are 
defined by their relations to one another on this account, they make no 
reference to stimuli or distal properties as objects.[41][42] Clark gives 
the example of orange, which cannot have properties that are inherent 
to the color itself, but can be known as something that appears as 
having the character of being both reddish and yellowish.43 The 
                                                 
36 Clark, A Theory of Sentience, 43. 
37 Ibid., 41. 
38 Ibid., 44. 
39 Austen Clark, “Phenomenal Properties: Some Models from Psychology and 
Philosophy,” Philosophical Issues 18 (2008): 408-409. 
40 Clark, A Theory of Sentience, 64, 66. 
41 Austen Clark, Sensory Qualities (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 192. 
42 Clark, A Theory of Sentience, 51. 
43 Ibid., 12. 
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discriminations of similarity and difference relations are among the 
properties of sensation that are not intrinsic, phenomenal properties.44 
Rather, Clark holds that the intentional character of the sensations is 
nothing over and above its spatial character.  
 Clark demonstrates that the relational aspect between qualities 
can be modeled with existential quantifiers, which highlights how the 
features themselves are not defined by their causal role, but rather by 
their relations to one another.45 For example, the Ramsey sentence for 
red is: Red (x1) ≡ (1)(2)(3)(4)(5) (C12 & M134 & R145 &....) where (x2) is 
green, (x3) is yellow, (x4) is orange, and (x5) is blue.46 C stands for the 
complements of a particular color, and xy are the color complements. 
Mxyz represents terms that stand in a mixing relation; for example, 
red and yellow mix to get orange. Rxyz describes qualities more 
similar to one color than another. Eventually the sentence can set 
equal the properties of brain states to qualitative properties.47   
 The Ramsey sentence, Clark says, emphasizes the 
interdependent nature of features.48 That is, features would not be 
what they are without their relations to one another. For example, the 
color red would not be what it is without the other qualities by which 
it is defined. In this way, Clark’s account contrasts with functionalist 
accounts of qualitative properties. I maintain however, that his 
account is still compatible with a causal closure condition because of 
its reductive nature. Furthermore, functionalism might not be the only 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 8, 11-12, 18. 
45 Ibid., 99, 142. 
46 Ibid., 141. 
47 Ibid, 141-142. 
48 Ibid., 142. 
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way to explain qualia and individuate their content. Instead, Clark 
holds that spatial representation can achieve both of these aims. 
 Clark offers that spatial representation acts to instantiate 
features at their spatio-temporal locations. He says that distinguishing 
the capacities of creatures to represent and discriminate space from 
the capacities individuals have to represent the features of sensation 
enables us to have the experience of the same quality at two different 
locations.49 This distinction aids in both individuating qualia, and 
solving the binding problem, or the problem of what allows 
ontologically separate features, like red, and square, to appear 
together as one cohesive perception.50 Multiple features can be bound 
together in a coherent perception because they are instantiated 
together at place-times. Spatial discrimination capacities of perceivers 
then pick out the place-times of features.  
 Clark also holds that feature-placing can be analogous to the 
feature-placing languages of P.F. Strawson, where picking out the 
locations of qualitative properties can act as a referent, of the 
designated term.51 He suggests that a causal chain from the referent to 
the designator happens only through perceptual encounters with the 
designator, and that spatial discrimination abilities account for 
reference.52 In this way, the feature-placing hypothesis presents a 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 35, 43. 
50 Ibid., 39. 
51 Ibid., 44. 
52 Ibid., 76. 
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nonconceptual alternative to postulating linguistic contents of 
qualitative properties.53 
 The reductive nature of qualitative properties can be seen 
through a creature’s use of neural feature maps. Clark suggests that 
cortical regions enable spatial discrimination capacities; areas of the 
cortex enable perceivers to discriminate the locations of sensory 
qualities.54 Clark holds that the cells of cortical regions corresponding 
to the sensory modalities can detect the incidence of basic features. 
This then leads to the detection of the location of qualitative 
properties. For example, in the auditory modality, detecting 
frequencies can enable perceivers to detect distances and other spatial 
features.55 The activation of cells in areas of the cortex enables a 
causal chain of the primitive detection of qualitative properties.56 
 
 Feature maps, place-coding, and selective attention 
 The mechanisms in the cortex that detect the locations of 
features are called feature maps. Feature maps are topographically 
organized and give a sensation a local region of occurrence.57 For 
example, feature maps representing in the visual cortex start with cells 
being able to make discriminations of edges, which will also be the 
discrimination of the locations of edges. Edges of colors, for example, 
are processed at this early stage of perception.[58][59] Processing the 
                                                 
53 Austen Clark, “Sensing, Objects, and Awareness,” 578. 
54 Clark, “How Do Feature Maps Represent?” 
55 Clark, “How Do Feature Maps Represent?” 
56 Clark, A Theory of Sentience, 62. 
57 Clark, “Location, Location, Location,” 293. 
58 Clark, “Feature-Placing,” 443. 
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locations of edges comes early in the hierarchy of perception because 
the edges are where the discriminable differences lie. This then, leads 
to spatial-discrimination abilities.60 Clark holds that feature maps can 
represent distal features and their locations, and this is the process of 
feature-placing.61   
 One way of getting from cells firing in the cortex to the 
locations of features is through place-coding. Place-coding links the 
information in feature maps to information that enables the locations 
of qualitative properties to be identified. The way this works is 
through the receptive fields of the nerves in a modality. They 
correspond to the activation patterns of neurons in the cortex. The 
location of receptive fields might correspond to a “pool” of neurons, 
as Clark says, that carry information about the location of the 
receptive field of the nerves.62 Clark gives an example of locating an 
itch: the pools of neurons in the somatosensory cortex correspond to 
distinct receptive fields on the skin, so when one pool activates, it 
carries information about where its receptive field is, and thus where 
the itch is located.63 In this way, the locations of sensation can be 
discerned with information from feature maps.  
 The feature-placing hypothesis sets out to explain only 
primitive sensory representation, since the processes feature-placing 
accounts for happen in the earliest stages of sensory experience. As 
feature-placing processes are the earliest stage of conscious 
                                                                                                                  
59 Clark, A Theory of Sentience, 134-135. 
60 Clark, “Location, Location, Location,” 295. 
61 Ibid., 294. 
62 Clark, A Theory of Sentience, 96. 
63 Ibid. 
110 
perception, feature maps that create representations identifying the 
incidence of features do not identify objects, or individuate them.64 In 
this way, feature-placing is an unconscious process on the part of 
perceivers.65 Clark maintains that following from this, that the 
contents of qualitative properties are nonconceptual, and pre-
linguistic.66 Early-content sensory processes lack object individuation, 
and recognition by the sentient individual of such processes.[67][68] For 
Clark, perceptual experience occurs in stages, the first of those being 
nonconceptual, and pre-attentive, or unconscious.  
 Accordingly, Clark argues in favor of the spotlight of 
attention, or selective-attention model, which is consistent with the 
idea that organisms process sensory content preattentively.69 The 
spotlight of attention theory, or selective attention model has it that 
the central processing system of a creature selects information from 
incoming peripheral processing. That information then falls into the 
attention of the organism, or is spotlighted. Clark states, “Selective 
attention is thought to be a process that selects some representations 
                                                 
64 Clark, “How Do Feature Maps Represent?” 
65 Austen Clark, “Sensory and Perceptual Consciousness,” in The Blackwell 
Companion to Consciousness, ed. Max Velmans and Susan Schneider (Hoboken: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2007), 446-447. 
66 Clark, A Theory of Sentience, 80. 
67 Ibid., 83. 
68 Austen Clark, “Feature-Placing and Proto-Objects,” Philosophical Psychology 17 
(2004): 466. 
69 Austen Clark, “Color, Qualia, and Attention,” in Color Ontology and Color 
Science, ed. Jonathan Cohen and Mohan Matthen (Cambdridge: MIT Press, 2010), 
http://selfpace.uconn.edu/paper/ClarkAusCQAtt.pdf, page 11. 
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but not others for further ‘central’ processing.”70 Clark iterates that 
basic features, on the hierarchical model of perception, are processed 
preattentively, and selective attention stands as the transition point 
between preattentive stages of perception, and the attentional 
awareness stage of perception.71 Features that are being processed 
simultaneously and in parallel, on Clark’s account are in a sense, in 
competition for selection.72 When they are selected, they surpass pre-
conscious processing into the state in which a subject has awareness 
of what she is perceiving.73  
 The mechanisms of selective attention are also consistent with 
content that is processed nonconceptually. Because receptors taking in 
preattentive processes cannot be turned off, as Clark says, parallel, 
peripheral processes are selected by mechanisms that highlight the 
information that eventually becomes conscious.74  In this way, 
preattentive processes are those that happen without a subject being 
consciously aware of these processes. Selective attention mechanisms 
allow for the possibility of distinguishing between the qualia, or the 
features themselves, and the awareness one has of perceiving those 
qualia.75 During preattentive perception, one is processing the basic 
                                                 
70 Austen Clark, “Cross-Modal Cueing and Selective Attention” in The Senses: 
Classical and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Fiona Macpherson 
(Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 376.  
71 Austen Clark, “Perception Preattentive and Phenomenal,” in Philosophy of 
Psychology and Cognitive Science, ed. Paul Thagard (New York: North 
Holland/Elsevier, 2007), 167.  
72 Ibid., 168. 
73  Clark, “Color, Qualia, and Attention,” 2. 
74 Ibid., 10. 
75 Ibid., 9-10. 
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qualia, while after those features are spotlighted, one can become 
aware of what is being perceived. 
 As this sort of bottom-up processing theory of perception 
entails, the feature-placing hypothesis will have it that these processes 
eventually lead to the conscious awareness of an organism. However, 
feature-placing works in a layered manner, starting with early, 
unconscious content, and does not refer to conscious awareness.76 In 
fact, Clark holds that affixing the notion of conscious awareness to all 
properties of the mental suggests that creature-consciousness is 
consistently subjectively veridical.77 He suggests that this paradigm 
creates a bias metaphysics for consciousness in that he states that this 
allows for appearances to generate reality.78 He holds that considering 
subjective experience to be fundamental gives the mental realm a 
metaphysical freedom that does not apply to explanations of 
phenomena in the physical sciences.79  
 Because the sensory content of feature-placing occurs 
nonconceptually, and because qualitative properties can be reduced to 
feature maps on Clark’s account, I hold that the feature-placing 
hypothesis meets a causal closure condition, and this supports a 
materialist account of mental phenomena that can help to bridge the 
explanatory gap. The aspect of Clark’s account that defines 
qualitative properties relationally, without reference to a physical 
cause, or to objects, presents a problem for functional accounts that tie 
                                                 
76 Clark, A Theory of Sentience, 88, 93. 
77 Clark, “Phenomenal Properties,” 421, 423. 
78 Ibid., 423. 
79 Ibid., 422-423. 
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explanations of behavior (for example, psychoneural or biological 
behavior) to the stimuli that caused the behavior. The motivation for 
such an account was seen through the work of Kim, above.  
Despite the incompatibility of Clark’s feature-placing hypothesis with 
the notion that reference to stimuli allows for a functional description 
of behavior, I hold that it remains compatible with a causal closure 
condition because qualitative properties, on the feature-placing 
hypothesis, are to be reduced to physical properties. Clark’s relational 
qualitative properties, and the postulated spatial discrimination 
abilities that organisms have to locate and discern those properties, 
together, provide a plausible answer to what individuates qualitative 
properties. For this reason, I think feature-placing can do work  
in providing an explanation that bridges conscious states with 
physical properties.  
 Kim’s account of mental causation and Clark’s account of 
feature-placing both suggest that qualia, if it is identified with 
intentionality, or conceptual content all-the-way-down will engender 
an impossible and impoverished analysis of the ontological nature of 
qualia. Clark and Kim seem to agree on one thing: that the intrinsic, 
ineffable nature of qualia has no causality in the physical world. [80][81]  
Clark’s feature-placing model is one way to achieve and represent the 
physicalism-near-enough that Kim puts forward, and that the causal 
closure of the physical world requires. In this way, the explanatory 
gap might be bridged from a materialist’s perspective because the 
sensory properties of mental qualia are explained relationally, and 
                                                 
80 Ibid., 423-424. 
81 Kim, Physicalism or Something Near Enough, 173-174. 
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 Where Clark’s feature-placing hypothesis addresses 
qualitative properties relationally, and identifies and individuates their 
content through spatial representation, the account only extends to 
primitive sensory content, and so to some advocates of the 
explanatory gap, might not address subjective experience completely. 
However, I offer here that this is the best characterization of 
qualitative properties, in so that they do not become epiphenomenal. 
For those who desire a theory of consciousness consistent with the 
completeness of physics, or an ontological naturalism, the view that 
qualitative properties are intrinsic aspects of subjective experience 
will most likely not bridge any gaps in explanation between 
consciousness and physicalism because these properties are non-
reductive, so it is hard to see how they remain causally effective upon 
conscious experience. In this way, the subjective experience of Nagel 
and the problems with physicalism in explaining consciousness 
suggested by Levine will be epiphenomenal properties of experience, 
if the causal closure of the physical world is correct.  
 Clark’s feature-placing hypothesis fits nicely with an 
ontological naturalism and causal closure, and extends the principles 
of materialism to concepts about the phenomenal. I offer that Clark’s 
feature-placing hypothesis also remains a viable candidate for the 
physical reduction of qualitative properties because it allows for 
nonconceptual, preattentive content, which bolsters its compatibility 
   115 
with a causal closure condition. This sort of account seems to  
provide some kind of bridge in explanation between consciousness 
and physicalism.  
 A psychophysical explanation of sensory experience, (one that 
connects perceptual states to the effects of the physical states of 
perceivers) such as feature-placing, provides an empirical basis to 
build more elaborate and exact theories of conscious experience. 
Describing our capacities to pick out features by spatially 
discriminating them allows for an objective characterization of “what 
it’s like,” as Clark says.82 This approach seems to make room for 
further empirical discoveries and hypotheses about qualitative 
properties that also aim at bridging the explanatory gap. 
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